The Independence variant littoral combat ships USS Tulsa (LCS 16), right; USS Manchester (LCS 14), centre; and USS Independence (LCS 2), left; sail in formation in the Pacific Ocean on February 27, 2019. LCSs are reportedly one of four types of combat ships sent to the Caribbean area. Photo by U.S. Pacific Fleet on Flickr (CC BY-NC 2.0).
At the southern tip of Trinidad, the village of Icacos lies fewer than 15 kilometres (9.3 miles) from Venezuela. On a clear day, residents can see the not-too-distant shores of the South American nation. For decades, the waters between these countries have carried the ordinary rhythms of fishing and small-scale trade. Today, however, they ebb and flow along a geopolitical fault line that threatens both local livelihoods and community security.
In recent months, the government of the United States has stepped up military deployments in the southern Caribbean, including warships and special operations aircraft operating near Venezuelan waters. Meanwhile, the government of Venezuela has warned that neighbouring states such as Trinidad and Tobago may become targets if its sovereignty is perceived to have been breached. For Trinidad’s border communities, this is not an abstract foreign policy problem; it carries very real implications for citizen security, local governance and development.
Rising security pressure in coastal communities
Fishermen in villages such as Icacos and Cedros now say they are avoiding larger fishing grounds farther from shore. “The U.S. has come there and the Venezuelan military is saying they are more present, so you have to watch out. At any point in time, outside there, you could be taken out,” one fisherman told The Associated Press. Their decision reflects a fear of being caught in the crosshairs. When patrols, naval vessels and surveillance increase, small-scale fishers lose access to their traditional zones; their catches shrink, and their incomes fall. The result is a direct threat to livelihoods, which in turn undermines local resilience and increases vulnerability to crime, social stress, and instability.
Trinidad and Tobago hosts the highest per capita concentrations of Venezuelan migrants in the Caribbean, many of them having arrived by sea under precarious conditions. Increased military activity off the coast raises the risk of misidentification at sea, particularly in maritime zones where civilian and illicit activities overlap.
Smuggling of arms, drugs and fuel across the southern waters has long been a challenge for local security forces, with southern Trinidad deeply embedded in informal networks, due partly to its geographic proximity to Venezuela. Local fishermen, for example, may find themselves operating in areas also used by smugglers, making them vulnerable to operations by foreign security forces. While these operations target transnational criminal networks, in a militarised environment, the line between civilian and suspect can blur, creating tension, confusion and fear among legitimate coastal workers, where the possibility of being caught in enforcement actions becomes an everyday worry.
The development citizen security link
The intersection of rising security tension and local well-being is particularly acute in small coastal communities. When border communities face disrupted livelihoods and elevated risks, whether through reduced fishing yields or precarious migration flows, the social fabric begins to fray. Across the region, border and coastal zones have experienced challenges due to intensified global and regional security strains.
Along the Dominican-Haiti border for example, the construction of a militarised fence in 2022 and deployment of additional security forces disrupted long-standing informal trade networks and weakened social cohesion among border residents. Similarly, recent open letters from regional civil society to the current chair of CARICOM, Jamaica’s Prime Minister Andrew Holness, warned that increased foreign military activity in the Caribbean Sea risked undermining livelihoods that depended on open maritime access, particularly for small-scale fisherfolk.
Beyond these geopolitical pressures, securitisation has also affected local economies through domestic enforcement measures. In Dominica’s Soufriere/Scotts Head Marine Reserve, for instance, tighter surveillance and stricter licensing within the protected area, initially intended for environmental conservation, altered traditional fishing access and generated tension between coastal communities and enforcement authorities.
Comparable patterns have also emerged internationally. In South Africa, small-scale fisherfolk in the port city of Durban were excluded from harbour access as maritime zones became securitised, eroding both livelihoods and social cohesion. Likewise, communities along the Indo-Pak and Pak-Afghan frontier have faced restricted movement, smuggling pressures and weakened local social capital as a result of prolonged militarisation and limited state investment.
The fact remains that schools, health services and local governance structures are not designed for sudden surges of strain linked to militarised dynamics. The term “citizen security” here refers to the condition of being free from the threat of violence or dispossession, tied to both objective and subjective dimensions of safety. Applied to this context and in daily life, it is centred on the ability to live, work and move freely, without fear of being pulled into external conflicts or being unfairly targeted during security operations. Therefore, the longer tensions escalate, the harder it becomes to maintain a sense of everyday security, which is essential to development and civic trust.
For the government of Trinidad and Tobago, the challenge is particularly thorny. On one hand, the state supports strengthened border control measures and international cooperation. On the other hand, it recognises that the twin-island republic does not seek direct involvement in a U.S.-Venezuela military standoff, though the risk of being drawn in is real.
At the regional level, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has made repeated appeals for the Caribbean to remain a zone of peace. In practice, this means that Trinidad and Tobago must navigate dual imperatives: ensuring local citizen security and development resilience, while maintaining sovereignty and avoiding becoming a proxy in a great-power contest.
The pressure on local communities is often overlooked in high-level diplomacy. While government leaders engage in formal talks about regional security, the day-to-day realities faced by residents of places like Icacos and Cedros rarely enter the conversation. Whether it’s fishermen losing access to waters they’ve relied on for generations, or families unsure of how spillover actions will affect their movements, the social costs are tangible — and without focused attention from policymakers, these populations risk becoming invisible in a security narrative they did not choose to be part of.
What could strengthen resilience?
With tensions escalating in the waters of Trinidad’s southern coast, resilience in border communities cannot be left to long-term planning alone. Immediate, coordinated action is needed to reduce risks and reinforce public safety in the face of uncertainty.
One practical step would be to establish rapid-response measures in high-risk coastal areas, particularly where civilian activity overlaps with increased security operations. Local security mechanisms could work together to define safe fishing corridors, distribute clear guidance to boat operators, and implement mobile check-ins to reduce the chance of misidentification at sea. Strengthening real-time communication between authorities and residents can also help limit fear, misinformation, and the perception that communities are being left to manage the situation on their own.
At the regional level, even where formal diplomatic alignment may be limited, Caribbean states can still engage in quiet, pragmatic coordination around shared security concerns. This could include maritime safety protocols, intelligence exchanges, and contingency planning to protect civilian lives should the security environment deteriorate further.
Behind-the-scenes collaboration may be more feasible than public statements at this stage, but it still signals that the region recognises the stakes for small, exposed communities caught near the fault lines of external conflict. By prioritising practical, citizen-focused interventions rather than waiting for diplomatic resolutions, small island developing states (SIDS) can help ensure that local populations are not left vulnerable amid heightened geopolitical tensions.
Holding the line at home
For the people of southern Trinidad, military tensions between two powerful neighbours are not a remote international issue. As the situation continues to unfold in waters that once sustained livelihoods and provided stability, the challenge now is to ensure that in responding to broader security concerns, the region does not overlook the very communities most at risk.
As any SIDS territory will know, development and security are inseparable; safeguarding one depends on protecting the other. As conditions shift, so too must the response, with urgency and attention being paid to realities on the ground. Only then can communities such as Icacos, Cedros and their neighbours maintain their stability in the face of storms brewing offshore.
